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Soft power and the challenges of
private actors: Turkey - Kurdish
Regional Government (KRG)
relations and the rising role of
businessmen in Turkish Foreign
Policy 
Merve Özdemirkıran
Although the formation of a Kurdish state in the Middle East is a political taboo in
Turkish foreign policy, Turkey adopted a more pragmatic position when Iraqi Kurds
started  to  build  a  Kurdish  state  in  2005,  when  the  new  Iraqi  constitution  was
proclaimed. The constitution did not only give the Kurds political autonomy but also 
economic  independence since  they  control  17%  of  Iraqi  oil  resources.  Currently,
businessmen from Turkey, both Turks and Kurds, are contributing to the construction
of  this  quasi  state’s1 physical  infrastructure,  while  the majority  of  food  and other
products  are exported  from  Turkey. Indeed,  Iraq  quickly  became Turkey’s fourth
largest economic partner: Turkish-Iraqi trade is worth over $ 7 billion and, according to
the Turkish consulate’s  statistics  in  Erbil,  65% of  this  is with the  Kurdish Regional
Government  (KRG)  specifically.2 These  businessmen  are  building bridges, highways,
airports,  universities  in  Iraqi  Kurdistan,  while  Turkish  is  gradually  becoming  the 
dominant language of the shop signs and business in general. Through such activities,
businessmen from Turkey  have  established a  bridge between Turkey  and the  KRG,
which  has generated  the  conditions  for  developing  bilateral  political  relations.
Considering the violence provoked in the whole region by the Syrian civil war since
2011,  Ankara’s  relations  with  its  eastern  neighbours  are  dramatically  affected.  Yet,
Erbil is today the only capital with whom Ankara has maintained its good relations and
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developed alliances in order to cooperate particularly for border security issues in the
framework of the fight against ISIS. 
The  role  these  businessmen  play  in  Turkey’s  involvement  in  KRG  state  building
illustrates economic interdependence in Turkey’s foreign policy and shows how the
state uses economic activity in order to attain its foreign policy objectives. In fact, one
of  these  objectives  is  to  expand  Turkish  influence  by  using  soft  power,  which  is
currently  being prioritised in  Turkish foreign policy,  especially  towards the Middle
East. Turkish soft power is basically defined by “the values that Turkey represents, by
its  history,  culture,  its  capacity  to  mobilise  regional  dynamics  and  to  create  new
spheres of influence” (Kalın 2012). Turkey’s economic capacities play a central role in
creating  these  new  spheres.  Turkey’s  business  activities  in  KRG  can  thus  provide
reliable empirical data to further analyse Turkey’s regional policy towards its “new”
neighbour, with whom security conflicts are not yet resolved. In other words, Turkey’s
position towards the Kurdish state building is a relevant case of the use of the soft
power as a foreign policy tool. 
Soft power (or co-optive power), first defined by J. Nye, is usually considered as a tool
controlled by public actors. States usually possess a variety of hard and soft power tools
that they can outsource to societal agents (Vuving 2009). In the case of Turkey’s soft
power in  KRG,  however,  private  actors  –  businessmen –  play  the major  role.  Their
activities  have  prepared  the  basis  for  bilateral  relations  and  created  a  favourable
context for Turkey to influence KRG. The Turkish state has taken advantage of these
activities in order to achieve its foreign policy goals, including spreading its soft power
in the Kurdish region. Thus, the positive situation has been created by private actors,
who actually avoid state control because of the effect of Turkey’s Kurdish question,
while the benefits are felt by the state. 
The consequences of these activities and the relations of these businessmen with the
state  make  the  concept  of  soft  power  more  complex  as  an  analytical  tool.  These
activities do not only influence foreign policy but also affect Turkish domestic politics.
Turkey’s Kurds with business activities in KRG are challenging the state in order to
enlarge their  negotiation space as  members  of  a  minority.  Thus,  Turkey’s  minority
issue becomes linked to a soft power foreign policy issue. This leads to the question of
how  much  soft  power  remains  an  explanatory  context  when  analysing  relations
between  private  actors  and  the  state.  This  phenomenon  therefore  needs  to  be
explained within the general context of Turkey’s use of soft power in its international
relations. This article aims to show, through the case of Turkey’s businessmen in KRG,
how the concept of soft power gains a larger definition as a means for private actors.
These  actors  benefit  from  the  state’s  desire  to  expand  its  soft  power,  in  order  to
strengthen their influence in domestic politics. 
The empirical data for this study comes from 45 semi-structured interviews conducted
in  Turkey  (Istanbul,  Ankara,  Gaziantep,  Diyarbakır)  and  in  Northern  Iraq  (Erbil)
between 2008 and 2011 with businessmen and representatives of business associations
and  chambers  of  commerce  and  industry  in  these  cities.3 This  article  focuses  on
interviews  with  those  businessmen  who  are  also  representatives  in  chambers  of
commerce and industry bodies. Their position in these organisations provides relevant
empirical  data  to  analyse  the  access  of  private  actors  to  the  political  sphere  and
relations between the state and these businessmen, specifically Kurdish businessmen
from southeast Turkey. The interviews show that businessmen from Turkey conducting
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economic  activities  in  KRG can be  divided into  two principal  groups  through their
ethnic identity: Turks or Kurds. Their motivations, size of their activities, relations with
state  authorities  in  Turkey  and  KRG,  manner  of  access  to  the  KRG market  depend
primarily on this ethnic factor. 
When the  activities  and positions  of  these  business  actors  are  analysed  within  the
framework  of  Turkish  soft  power,  three  main  stages  can  be  identified.  First,  their
activities were not officially supported by the Turkish state until the opening of the
Turkish  consulate  in  Erbil.  That  is,  from 2005  to  2010,  businessmen contributed  to
Turkey’s soft power in spite of the state. Kurdish businessmen from southeast Turkey
have played a key role through their kinship and language skills. Their motivation to
contribute the emerging Kurdish quasi state has enabled the development of economic
exchange  between  Turkey  and  KRG.  In  contrast,  during  this  period,  few  Turkish
businessmen  were  committed  to  these  economic  relations  while  they  experienced
many obstacles, such as long delays at the Turkish Iraqi border. More recently, these
business  people  have  been  integrated  with  the  Turkish  state’s  policy  of  economic
integration with Northern Iraq. By opening a consulate in the Iraqi Kurdistan’s capital,
Erbil, the Turkish government recognised symbolically the autonomous status of KRG,
which made Turkey’s soft power strategies more visible in the region. The third stage
relates to the new status that businessmen, especially Kurds from southeast Turkey,
gained  by  being  in  harmony  with  the  state’s  new  foreign  policy  objectives.  This
agreement  has  allowed  them  to  participate  in  foreign  policy  decision-making
processes,  where  they  can negotiate  their  conditions  with  the  state  and ultimately
achieve more influence in domestic politics. 
In  the  following  sections,  these  three  stages  will  be  analysed  within  the  general
framework of relations between the state and businessmen in Turkish foreign policy.
The political impact of business activities on soft power will be emphasised to show
how  non-state actors  are  using  their  status  in  the  state’s  soft  power  strategies  to
strengthen their negotiation capacities with the state. 
 
I. The influence capacities of businessmen regarding
Turkish foreign policy 
Over the last thirty years, the actions of businessmen have had a considerable impact
on decision-making in Turkish foreign policy due to the intensification of economic
exchanges  on  a  global  scale,  the  consolidation  of  financial  markets  and  the
development of communicative tools, as a result of economic globalisation. Although
the multiplicity of means of action, organisational models and institutional or social
structures  of  the  variety  of  stakeholders  that  have  emerged  at  the  centre  of
globalisation regularly affect international relations, it is the economy and economic
stakeholders that critically determine foreign policies (Carron de la Carrière 2002: 270).
That is, economic factors, unlike others, are always present, even omnipresent (Carron
de la Carrière 2002: 271). 
The omnipresence of the economy also leads actors to avoid armed conflict in order to
preserve  their  economic  interests  in  the  international  system.  States,  developed
countries in particular, avoid conflicts between themselves and regularly seek means of
cooperation  to  resolve  disputes  non-militarily,  without  wasting  their  large  military
budgets (Doyle 1997). Thus, the international system, controlled by economic factors,
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no longer  supports  direct  armed conflict  between developed states.  By  abandoning
armed methods and further concentrating on economic factors and means, these states
have created a trading world, albeit one that remains imperfect or even powerless to
prevent  conflicts  at  times,  and  criticised  by  the  originator  of  the  concept,  R.
Rosecrance.4
In  the  context  of  economic  globalisation,  businessmen  and  their  organisations  are
considered  more  and  more  frequently  as  central  stakeholders  in  the  international
system. Furthermore, as the liberal approach to international relations theories states,
international  economic  exchanges  that  contribute  to  the  growth  of  the  actions  of
businessmen  constitute  a  solid  basis  for  maintaining  international  peace,  a  critical
phenomenon  that  helps  states  avoid  potential  conflicts.  International  economic
exchanges,  maintained  and  developed  by  economic  stakeholders,  allow  states  to
consolidate reciprocity and interdependence.
Economic  stakeholders  can  also  be  characterised  as  transnational  actors  in  their
internationally  created  networks,  their  organisations  at  national  and  international
levels,  in  their  capacity  to influence  international  bodies  and  establish,  in  certain
circumstances, a rival to the state. Their transnational character, which is to say their
capacity to act beyond all borders (physical, legal, social, psychological, etc.), permits
them to develop a strong capacity to orient or determine state foreign policy strategies
while  creating  a  parallel  space  to  international  relations,  a  space  dominated  by
transnational  relations  (Nye  and Keohane 1972).  Transnational  relations  include  all
relations that, whether by deliberate will or by destination, take place in a global space
beyond a state’s national framework which produces itself by at least partially escaping
the control or the mediating actions of states (Badie and Smouts 1995: 70). 
Among  these  transnational  stakeholders,  businessmen and  their  organisations  are
characterised by their relatively privileged position and specific relations with states.
In the current global economic system, their actions, the results of their activities and,
at times, their opposition to state policies affect these policies more directly than other
transnational  stakeholders. Furthermore,  this  influence  enables  them  to  gain  state
recognition as “legitimate stakeholders” that can participate in the decision-making
process. In this way, they manage to impose themselves more effectively in the political
sphere (Winters 1996). 
The  era  of  globalisation  and,  most  importantly,  the  progressive  integration  of  the
Turkish economy with international markets following the transformation of Turkey’s
national  economy to  a  free  market  in  the  1980s,  gave  Turkish  businessmen a  new
source of legitimacy. They enlarged their negotiation space with the state which -as
many studies on the state/business-world relationships (e.g. A. Buǧra 2007; M. Heper
1991) and on the history of the political economy in Turkey, (e.g. Ҫ. Keyder 1987; K.
Boratav 2012)  state-  controls  economic policies,  determines the country’s  economic
objectives, and manifests itself as the principal economic stakeholder and which also
therefore defines the scope of entrepreneurs and their interest groups. 
Indeed, the Turkish state, at least until the 1990s, imposed control, predominantly in
the  economic  sphere,  to  limit  the  emergence  of  new  “fields  of  power”  (champs  du
pouvoir) that, according to P. Bourdieu, are formed by the holders of other kinds of
capital,  be  it  cultural,  symbolic  or  economic.  These  fields  of  power  construct
themselves as a game-space, at the centre of which the holders of different kinds of
capital struggle, particularly for power over the state. By exerting power over state
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capital they gain power over other kinds of capital and their reproduction (Bourdieu
1993: 52). Fearful of all types of rivalry from capital-holders (for example intellectuals,
artists and above all entrepreneurs) who can endanger its monopoly over the control of
resources, the Turkish state limited the autonomy and the space of action of (private)
holders of economic capital, the businessmen. Therefore, these economic stakeholders
held back so the Turkish authorities could not use the economy as an effective foreign
policy tool. 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, despite previous difficulties, the Turkish economy has
developed steadily, with foreign trade occupying a prominent place. It has grown 15
times larger in the last twenty-five years while being profoundly modified, and now
constitutes  the  fulcrum  of  the  Turkish  economy.  Whereas  Turkey  used  to  export
agricultural  and  mining  products  in  the  early  1980s  (57%  of  exports  came  from
agricultural products, for example), nowadays 90% of Turkish economic exports come
from  industrial  products  (textiles  and  clothing,  intermediary  goods,  and  consumer
goods  such  as  cars  and  household  appliances)  (Insel  2008:  131).  This  economic
expansion has made foreign trade an increasingly valuable foreign policy tool, while
making Turkey a trading state, a state able to use international economic exchange as
an integral element for determining its foreign policy (Rosecrance 1986). 
Turkey’s  foreign  policy  and  Turkey’s  integration  into  the  international  system,  for
example  its  European  Union  candidacy,  have  become  a  new  space  for  Turkish
businessmen to influence. Through their economic activities abroad, they have started
a new relationship with the state and gained greater “legitimacy” in negotiations with
the state while playing an intermediary role between Turkey and foreign countries.
According to Buğra, if  Turkish entrepreneurial activities fully agree with the state’s
self-defined interests and objectives then this compatibility makes the state consider
their activities as legitimate5 (Buğra 2007: 42). 
The new critical role of economic stakeholders in the international system with the
development of transnational relations supports Turkish businessmen, especially since
successive  Justice  and  Development  Party  [Adalet  ve  Kalkınma  Partisi –  AKP]
governments have set a foreign policy goal of making Turkey a regional power, even a
global player, due to its economic growth. The domestic transformation of Turkey’s
political economy has brought the political and economic spheres closer together, as M.
Kutlay argues: “the restructuring of domestic business actors and the emergence of a
new competitive  capitalist  class  underpinned the  economic  arm of  Turkish  foreign
policy”. Thus, the economy became “the practical hand” of Turkey’s new foreign policy
(Kutlay 2011). 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, new conditions governing foreign policy have given
Turkish businessmen and their associations a unique opportunity to participate more
actively in policy-making.6 Even if their activities correspond to the state’s goals and
interests,  that is,  to those national interests that have been the principal  source of
legitimacy  for  entrepreneurs  since  the  Turkish  republic  was  founded,  the  role  of
international economic exchanges in Turkey’s relations with foreign countries is giving
them for the first time an autonomy that allows them to strengthen their position in
domestic  affairs.  Moreover,  as  noted  by  K.  Kirișçi,  the  nature  of  the  trading  state
requires the involvement of many stakeholders in the formation of foreign policy or
diplomatic  games.  However,  the  priorities  and  interests  of  these  stakeholders
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sometimes differ  from those of  traditional  foreign policy  makers  in  Turkey (Kirişçi
2009). 
Through their “legitimacy” and state recognition when their actions coincide with the
broad lines of foreign policy, they become stronger stakeholders in domestic policy-
making.  Thus,  foreign policy,  which is,  with a  few exceptions (e.g.  Z.  Öniș),  under-
researched  in  the  existing  literature  on  state/businessmen  relations  in  Turkey,
becomes  a  key  variable  for analysing  relations  between  the  Turkish  state  and
businessmen.  Turkey’s  EU candidacy  is  a  prime example  of  how businessmen have
become influential stakeholders in politics in that the outcome of the Helsinki Summit
led  the  political  and  economic  key  players  in  Turkey  to  take  the  initiative  in
implementing EU-mandated institutional changes (Öniş and Bakır 2005). 
During this particular period,  and also later,  businessmen and business associations
were charged with overseeing legislation and implementing reforms demanded for EU
integration,  thereby acting as  central  players  in Turkish civil  society.  Furthermore,
they  intervened in  the  debate  on  Turkish  democratisation  by  influencing  domestic
policy.  Indeed,  the way Turkish entrepreneurs,  large corporations and large groups
from  Istanbul’s  republican  bourgeoisie,  viewed  Turkey’s  EU  accession  efforts  is
particularly  interesting.  In  one  study  analysing  the  attitudes  of  Turkish  citizens
regarding  the  economic,  political,  and  cultural  effects  of  Turkey’s  EU  candidature,
businessmen were notable for their support for Turkey’s EU accession while exerting a
certain pressure at a national level to drive the political authorities to pursue reform.
Macroeconomic  stability,  the  EU’s  development  support,  foreign direct  investments
(FDI), expanding the market for Turkish exports through preferential trade agreements
with EU member states all motivated businessmen to push Turkey’s political leaders to
move forward towards achieving EU membership (Aybar et al. 2007: 337 and 347). 
This involvement of businessmen in the European project throughout the 1990s and at
the beginning of the 2000s, made this group a key stakeholder in civil society. As an
intermediary  player  between  Turkey  and  foreign  states,  these  businessmen  were
recognised by the state as an actor in foreign policy. According to Z. Öniș, through their
support for Turkey’s candidacy and EU accession, business associations,  particularly
TÜSİAD [Türkiye Sanayici ve İșadamları Derneǧi - the Association of Turkish Businessmen
and Industrials],  remained integral  drivers of  this  project  domestically due to their
influence on the state and political actors (Öniş 2006: 284-292).
As well as willingly supporting the work of businessmen and associations like TÜSİAD
in the European project, particularly between 1999 and 2002, the AKP government also
favoured their business activities in targeted regions (the Middle East, Africa, Central
Asia) as part of A. Davutoǧlu’s foreign policy strategy. AKP has a close relationship with
the “pious” business community of Anatolia that has for over ten years constituted the
“new bourgeoisie” in Turkey. MÜSİAD,7 which is made up of representatives of this new
pious bourgeoisie,  has been progressively taking the place of TÜSİAD, which is now
considered as representing “Istanbul’s former, secular and Western bourgeois class”.8
This newly emerging bourgeoisie currently accomplishes the tasks assigned to Turkish
businessmen within the framework of the diplomatic goals of Turkey’s political leaders:
the establishment of an “economic diplomacy”, which has also been applied by other
emerging  economies,  such  as  China,  South  Africa,  Brazil  and  India.  The  goals  of
economic diplomacy allow businessmen to acquire a unique legitimacy (albeit similar
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to that of TÜSİAD within the European project) due to the perfect compatibility of their
activities with the national interests determined by political leaders.9 
Economic  diplomacy  involves  using  a  country’s  tools  and  capabilities  (trade,
investment,  finance,  organisation,  development,  etc.)  to  protect  its  interests  in  its
relations with both neighbouring countries and countries outside its region, and also in
decision-making bodies of the international system, while operating from a logic of
cooperation without resorting to force or direct coercion. Economic diplomacy requires
the state to develop its soft power in foreign relations, which enables it to become a key
player in international negotiations. 
 
II. The role of businessmen in Turkey’s relations with
the KRG
A  policy  that  implements  economic  diplomacy  considers  businessmen  as  central
stakeholders in the process.  Businessmen conducting economic activities within the
territory of a de facto Kurdish state have thus become the bearers of an economic tool in
Turkey’s policy, which has enabled them to acquire a certain level of compatibility with
the  national  interests  determined  by  the  government.  Consequently,  despite
predictable conflicts between Turkey and the KRG regarding border security and the
presence  of  PKK  militants  on  Kurdish  soil,  and  despite  the  opposition  of  Turkey’s
military  (at  least  until  2010),  Turkey’s  political  authorities  have  not  restricted  the
businessmen’s activities. Furthermore, they have not openly challenged the legitimacy
of these activities, which are also essential for any entrepreneurial economic activity in
Turkey to survive and succeed (Buğra 2007). In other words, the Turkish businessmen’s
activities in the Kurdish region of Iraq have gradually inscribed themselves in Turkey’s
foreign policy as a trading state. 
Until the opening of the Turkish consulate in Erbil on March 11, 2010, the Turkish state
had not established a specific policy regarding this new category of stakeholders who
were certainly supporting economic relations with the KRG according to most state
leaders.10 However, their activities were not yet recognised as a key element in political
relations  as  Turkish  public  opinion  was  still  quite  sensitive  regarding  the  Kurdish
question and the presence of rear PKK bases on KRG soil. As one entrepreneur, who had
experienced business problems due to a lack of Turkish diplomatic representation in
KRG,  states,  “the  government  was  neither  a  support  nor  a  hindrance”  during  this
period.11
 
Conditions in which entrepreneurs started their business activities
Trade between Turkey and KRG is relatively specific with respect to business conducted
by  Turkish  entrepreneurs  in  other  countries.  Border  security  issues  related  to  the
Kurdish conflict and the unsatisfactory development of the Kurdish question in Turkey
have both hindered the economic relationship while paradoxically strengthening the
role of businessmen. 
As mentioned in the introduction, the group of businessmen analysed in this research
is not homogenous but forms two groups: owners of big businesses and owners of small
and medium size enterprises, considering the type, volume and size of their economic
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activities.  Regarding  sociological  characteristics,  the  principal  point  of  division
corresponds more or less to an ethnic division between Turks or Kurds. 
At  the  same time,  however,  there  are  many intersections  between these  two main
groups. The majority of big business owners are Turks with businesses mainly sited in
western Turkey whereas owners of small and medium business are mostly Kurds from
southeast  Turkey  where  the  Kurdish  population  is  the  majority.  When  these
businessmen  were  asked  to  explain  their  initial  motivation  to  conduct  business
activities in KRG, regardless of business size and location, Kurds replied that ethnic
identity was the source. They stated that they started business activities in KRG for
“observing  the  first  steps  of  the  first  Kurdish  state,  contributing  to  the  economic
development  of  this  quasi  state  and  also  developing  Turkey’s  southeast  economic
structure.” These motivations are thus not necessarily linked to traditional business
interest motivations.12 Turks’ motivations were significantly different. The most salient
was to find new business markets and partners in the Middle East to avoid the negative
effects of the 2008 global economic crisis. Some of them also stated that their activities
“contribute to Turkey’s  regional  power capacities  in the region and they support a
peaceful dialogue between Turkey and Iraqi Kurds” (Özdemirkıran 2013). 
The  businessmen,  both Turks  and Kurds,  persisted  with  their  activities  despite  the
reluctance  of  Turkey’s  state  authorities,  a  lack  of  support  or  state  incentive,  and
restrictions, security threats and tensions between Ankara, Erbil and Bagdad because of
PKK bases in Qandil, long queues at the Khabour border gate because of these tensions,
and hostile public opinion in Turkey. 
One of the most important common problems that affected business conditions was
blockages  at  the  Khabour  border  gate.  These  long  queues  had  three  causes.  First,
numerous local merchants from the border region are conducting cross-border trade
activities in mini-vans (buying cigarettes, tea, rice, etc. from Iraq to sell in Turkey at a
higher  price).  Because  their  status  is  not  clearly  defined,  the  merchants  and  their
merchandise  have  to  pass  regular  controls  without  using  commercial  procedures
reserved for recognised trade activities. This unclear status creates chaos at the border
where only 4 or 5 out of 30 counters are usually open. Even though businessmen from
southeast Turkey welcome these activities for local economic development, they also
demand structural changes at the border and a privileged procedure for crossing the
border  to  bypass  the  local merchants’  queue,  to  enter  KRG  more  quickly  to  sign
contracts, contact their partners or develop their business. The second problem is that,
until  the  end  of  2010,  there  was  a  second  checkpoint  at  Khabour  operated  by  the
military,  at  which Turkish citizens were asked to  declare  their  reason for  entering
Kurdistan. This caused long waits and sometimes even refusals for businessmen from
Turkey. Third, tension between KRG and Turkey rose because of Turkey’s military raids
into the Qandil mountains against PKK militants and politicians’ hostile declarations.13
Nevertheless, businessmen have continued their activities despite these unfavourable
conditions. In other words, they have carried out activities that benefit the Turkish
state,  despite  its  conscious  and  unconscious  restrictions,  by  developing  economic
relations and laying strong foundations for further cooperation between Turkey and
KRG. 
My field study in Turkey and Northern Iraq on businessmen’s economic activities in the
KRG  shows  that  businessmen  are  indeed  at  the  origin  of  the  improved  political
relations  between  Turkey  and  KRG.  While  the  implementation  of  a  trading  state
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strategy and the willingness of the state to diffuse its soft power economically were
certainly central to their business activities, at least up until 2010, it was businessmen
themselves who were the central stakeholders in bilateral relations. In fact, they are
the ones who convinced the Turkish state to open a diplomatic representative body in
the Kurdish capital, Erbil.  The opening of the Turkish Consulate in Erbil is indeed a




Turkish diplomacy has come to Kurdistan through the pressure of businessmen whose
demands and organisation have affected the decisions of  the Turkish authorities.  It
should be noted here that opening a diplomatic representation in Erbil amounts to a
symbolic  recognition  of  Kurdistan,  which  was  previously  taboo  in  Turkish  politics.
Although Turkey had recognised KRG’s  autonomous status by recognising the  Iraqi
Constitution of 2005, the implementation of this recognition, and the transition from
an informal  to  formal  situation,  took time for  the  Turkish  authorities  and Turkish
public opinion. 
The Gaziantep and Diyarbakır Chambers of Commerce mediated between the Turkish
state and Turkish businessmen. The economic representatives of the two southeastern
Turkish  cities  that  benefit  the  most  from  economic  exchanges  with  KRG  actively
engaged  themselves  in  communicating  entrepreneurial  requests  to  the  state  and
expanding trade with Iraq. For example, Mehmet Arslan, former president of Gaziantep
Chamber of Commerce, several times invited former secretary of state in foreign trade,
Kürşat Tüzmen, to Gaziantep, especially for the exposition Gateway to Iraq14 in order to
bring  together  the  minister  and  businessmen active  in  Iraq  or  who were  planning
activities there.15 Gaziantep Chamber of Commerce also prepares regular export reports
for the Ministry of  Economy in which it  emphasises  the needs and priorities  of  its
members. Personal political relations of the president and other influential members
also  allows  the  problems,  needs  and  propositions  of  local  businessmen  to  be
communicated to Ankara. Diyarbakır Chamber of Commerce and Industry is also very
much committed to developing relations between state authorities and local business
actors. For example, its former president, Mehmet Kaya, organised a meeting in 2008 in
Diyarbakır  with  representatives  of  Erbil  Chamber  of  Commerce  and  local  political
authorities,  including  the  Governor,  and  Deputy  Governors  from  various  parts  of
southeast Turkey. This meeting, which took place at a very crucial moment when the
political tension in the region was high just after PKK attacks on a police station in
Aktütün, gave birth to a commercial protocol between Diyarbakır and Erbil Chambers
of  Commerce.  This  protocol  became  a  model  for  other  chambers  that  signed
commercial agreements with Erbil Chamber of Commerce16. 
Galip Ensarioğlu, another former president of Diyarbakır Chamber of Commerce and
Industry agreed that “the Chamber was fighting for a consulate in Erbil”, adding that
during each meeting with the political authorities in Ankara he stressed the necessity
of this consulate to enable the activities of Diyarbakır’s businessmen to continue. He
used  his  personal  political  relations  to  express  the  needs  and  problems  of  local
entrepreneurs regarding economic activities in KRG.17 
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The establishment of the Association of Turkish-Iraqi Businessmen and Businesswomen
[Türk-Irak Ortadoğu İşkadınları ve İşadamları Derneği] in 2009 also allowed businessmen to
increase  their  relations  with  Turkish  and  Kurdish  leaders  to  negotiate,  without
intermediaries,  about  their  specific  requests  concerning  Turkish-Iraqi  trade.  The
president of this organisation, Sıdıka Halıcıoğlu, and her vice-president, Erkut Temiz,
conceived  what  they  called  “the  summit  of  the  Turkish  economy”,  in  which  the
president  of  TOBB,  Rifat  Hisarcıklıoğlu,  and  Zafer  Çağlayan,  former  Minister  of
Economy, obtained direct meetings with the aim of explaining the general problems
affecting  economic  activities  between  Turkey  and  Iraq  and  the  requests  of  all
businessmen, not only the requests of members of the association.18 
With the explicit consent of the Turkish state through the opening of the consulate,
business  activities  multiplied  in  Kurdistan.  As  Soran  Aziz,  vice-president  of  Erbil’s
Chamber  of  Commerce,  put  it,  “businessmen  began  to  ‘run’  towards  Erbil”.19 The
consulate has facilitated business travel from cities in western Turkey to Iraq. Business
people from Turkey had previously been reluctant to seize the economic opportunities
offered  in  the  Kurdish  region  of  Iraq  due  to  general  prejudices  in  Turkey  about
“Kurds”. For example, the secretary general of the Chamber of Industry in Istanbul,
who was interviewed immediately following a visit to Erbil with a group of members of
the chamber, stated that official diplomatic representation in Erbil eased his members’
safety concerns and convinced the board of directors of the Chamber of Industry of
Turkey’s largest city to organise a discovery trip: 
Indeed,  after  the crisis  [of  2008],  Iraq was on the agenda as  a  potential  market
among the countries of the region, but we didn’t dare to take a step towards Iraq,
for security reasons. Now, when our official representatives called upon us for a
possible visit while ensuring security conditions, we decided to go and the political
decision of the Turkish state to open a consulate reinforced our decision.20
As part of the new trading state policy in the region, and particularly concerning KRG,
businessmen played a principal  role in developing Kurdish-Turkish relations:  “They
were equally diplomats, intermediaries, and a source of information for the Turkish
government.”21 Their activities created an interdependent relationship between Turkey
and KRG while also convincing politicians to abandon the logic of conflict to bring the
political language in line with the economic. In this, they took on the role of a diplomat,
who, according to R. Aron, “should lead the diplomatic-strategic conduct and speak on
behalf of the collective of the state, accompanied by the ‘soldier’ who kills in the name
of the aforementioned collective of the state” (Aron, 2008: 17). 
These businessmen currently place a distance between the soldier and the diplomat,
and  accompany  and  guide  them  despite  their  non-state  character.  The  traditional
cooperation between the diplomat and the soldier, the two representatives of the state,
have transformed themselves to the benefit  of  the businessman involved in foreign
policy.  The case of Turkish businessmen economically active in Kurdistan is a clear
example  to  emphasise  the  change  from a  policy  determined  from a  perspective  of
probable conflict to a policy determined by potential cooperation, especially economic,
favoured by the new ruling elite in Turkey,  whose political  rise is  closely linked to
Turkey’s economic development. 
These economic exchanges have facilitated the development of government policies
and official links with KRG. The first official high-level visit to KRG was organised with
businessmen accompanied by the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, A. Davutoğlu, and
the former Minister of the Economy, Zafer Çağlayan (at the time, the Under-Secretary
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for  Foreign Trade22).  According to  Sıdıka Halıcıoğlu,  President  of  the Association of
Turkish-Iraqi  Businessmen and  Businesswomen,  who  was  among the  entrepreneurs
that  accompanied  the  two  ministers  on  this  visit,  the  Turkish  state  called  on
businessmen to organise this first official visit. Halıcıoğlu was called by the Minister of
the Economy, who wanted to ensure that she participated in the delegation. However,
she politely refused to travel with the ministers:
Since after all the efforts that I had made with Mr. Dara [Dara Ali, the President of the
Chamber of Commerce in Erbil, a central figure in relations between Turkey and KRG] for
the development of trade, I wanted to host the ministers as a hostess from Erbil to
speak with them about this trade.23
The  president’s  position  confirms  the  distance  that  entrepreneurs  want  to  keep
between themselves and the political sphere in order to stand together with their Iraqi
counterparts when a visit  with state stakeholders takes place.  It  also reinforces the
relative  independence  that  Turkish  entrepreneurs  are  beginning  to  have  in  their
relations with the Turkish state, demonstrating that they prefer to preserve their non-
state character.
During  this  visit  with  the  businessmen,  A.  Davutoğlu  officially  announced Turkey’s
decision to open a consulate in Erbil, adding that the diplomatic delegation’s members
were all to feel at home and that the common will would rebuild the Middle East with
feelings of closeness. He also focused on the economic development of Erbil: “We can
jointly contribute to the development of Erbil. This will be a bridge between Turkey
and Iraq. We [Turkey] are the open door between Iraq and the European Union and
Erbil  is  our  open  door  to  Basra”  (Zaman Oct.  31,  2009).  This  visit  aroused  great
enthusiasm in KRG, with headlines like “Turkey has recognised Iraqi Kurdistan” and
“Let’s all do business in the Middle East!” (Çubukçu Nov. 3, 2009).
Soran Aziz, Vice President of the Erbil Chamber of Commerce, said with joy shortly
before Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan’s visit to Erbil in March 2011: “the economy
that  brought  the  Prime  Minister  to  Erbil”.24 The  two  main  topics  of  the  meeting
between Erdoğan and Barzani concerned the economy and security.
 
III. Beyond soft power: From state strategy to non-
state actors’ benefits 
Turkish soft power consolidated by the economy
The economic activities discussed here have contributed to Turkey’s soft power. Soft
power is the primary tool of a trading state, which, rather than prioritising its military
capabilities above all  other advantages, imposes its will  through economic strength,
language or cultural influence. 
The economic  activities  of  businessmen from Turkey have led  Iraqi  Kurds  to  learn
Turkish, for example. Learning Turkish is becoming increasingly lucrative for the Iraqi
Kurdish  youth,  who  consider  Turkey  as  their  only  opening  to  the  West  and
international markets.25 Accordingly, Kurdish businessmen and shopkeepers in Erbil,
Souleimaniya,  Dohuk  and  Zakho  increasingly  speak  Turkish.  Similarly,  it  is  not
uncommon  nowadays  to  meet  a  Kurd  who  speaks  Turkish  on  the  city  streets,
mentioning  Turkish  film  and  television  stars,  or  young  Turkish-speaking  Kurdish
businessmen coming to  the consulate  in  Erbil  with their  Turkish associates  to  sign
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contracts or apply for visas to meet other businessmen in Turkey. As the Commercial
attaché of the Turkish consulate in Erbil, D. Kutlu mentioned, visa applications have
increased at a “dizzying rate”.26 
KRG’s economic dependence on Turkey gives rise to a cultural closeness with Turkey,
which  wishes  to  influence  the  region  both  culturally  and  politically,  using  the
instruments of soft power. Turkish private schools,  known as “Gülen schools”, have
been  recently  added  to  Turkey’s  presence.  Economic  exchanges  prepare  the
groundwork  for  such  influence,  even  in  a  region  whose  existence  and  even  name,
“Kurdistan”, were long considered taboo and previously expressed with contempt by
both Turkish leaders and the Turkish public. Turkey now conducts relations with KRG
while trying to avoid conflicts due to the Kurdish question in the region by applying
the same strategy developed for all dealings with the Middle East, which avoid direct
military  intervention  while  focusing  on  soft  power.  As  claimed  by  Meliha  Benli
Altunıșık, despite the limitations imposed by the political and economic structure of
the region, Turkey has every chance to pursue a policy of soft power in the Middle East
since, as compared to its neighbours in the region, it has implemented social, economic
and political structural reforms that make it stronger and influential internationally
(Altunışık 2005).
Nearly all the businessmen interviewed noted that economic exchanges have led the
Iraqi Kurds to deepen their relations with Turkey, buy real estate in major Turkish
cities to spend their holidays and, most importantly, send their children to Turkey for
higher education. Muhammad, for example, the son of a businessman from Erbil, who
studied law at Bilkent University in Ankara, said that going to study in Turkey is as
prestigious as going to the United States or Europe: 
All my friends and me, we went to the Turkish school, Ișık Koleji, it’s one of the best
schools here. Now, thanks to my Turkish, I help my father in his businesses with the
Turks. 27
The case of relations between Turkey and KRG shows how the mobilisation of economic
resources  can  play  a  central  role  in  solving  political  problems  caused  by  previous
conflicts. Turkey is consolidating its presence in Kurdistan through its products and
culture (language, popular culture), using its soft power as the main tool to aid its goal
of  becoming  a  regional  power.  As  for  KRG,  Kurdish leaders  seek  to  develop  their
relationship with their Western neighbour, a candidate for the European Union, the
17th global economy, a member of NATO and the G20, in short their only neighbour
which is integrated with the Western world and that takes part in the international
system.  Even if  the  Kurdish  government  preferred  that  the  Kurdish  region  remain
within the federal system in Iraq, every Iraqi national crisis that creates obstacles to
the KRG’s state building process leads the Kurds to make statements suggesting their
possible independence. These statements indicate that independence is the ultimate
goal of the Iraqi Kurds, although it has been put on hold by KRG leaders during Iraq’s
reconstruction process since 2003. Federal problems have led Iraq’s Kurds to develop
independent policies, to seek ways to self-manage their economy (especially regarding
oil resources), to establish strong ties with foreign countries through the investment
opportunities  they offer,  and to build  an independent foreign policy through these
economic relationships. For example, in May 2012, KRG announced a proposed pipeline
to transport one million barrels of oil per day to Turkey, which the Turkish Minister of
Energy welcomed. However, the central government in Baghdad severely criticised this
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proposal, denouncing the attitude of the KRG, claiming to be the sole legitimate holder
of power concerning Iraq’s natural resources (Çandar May 26, 2012). 
This announcement was made after KRG Prime Minister Nachirvan Barzani’s visit to
Ankara.  Since the beginning of  2012,  Ankara’s  relations  with Baghdad have cooled.
Indeed, Turkey, which had been slow to open a consulate in Erbil, is now beginning to
take the Kurdish leaders more seriously and privilege its relations with them to ensure
their energy needs. Turkey is beginning to consider the KRG as a future independent
state rich in natural resources, a neighbour with whom bilateral relations, which can
develop on an economic basis,  need to be improved.  In fact,  Turkey’s  trading state
foreign policy led by Turkish and Kurdish leaders has allowed them to build a political
dialogue  that  has  been  gradually  transformed into  bilateral  political  relations.  The
Diyarbakır  meeting  of  Masoud  Barzani  and  Tayyip  Erdoğan  in  November  2013
illustrates  perfectly  this  emergence  of  a  political  partnership  between Turkish  and
Kurdish governments. Moreover, despite many structural changes in the Middle East
caused by the violence around the Syrian civil war, this partnership persists. Ankara
and Erbil, both maintained economic and political ties in order to develop an alliance
especially in the domains of energy and security. Border security issues linked to the
ISIS threats, involvement of both capitals in the fight against ISIS, Turkey’s military
commitment in Bashika base in Mosul, challenges and fight against PKK in the South
East  Turkey  after  the  failure  of  the  peace  process28 for  the  resolution  of  Kurdish
question since  summer 2015,  all  made this  partnership  even more crucial  for  both
sides. In an interview where he has called on global leaders to broker a new deal in the
Middle East paving the way for a Kurdish state, KRG president M. Barzani declared that
Turkey would not oppose KRG’s independence (Chulov Jan. 22, 2016). What makes this
declaration more important is that it was pronounced in a very sensitive period where
fights between Turkish security forces and PKK militants were intensive in several city
centres in the South East Turkey. That shows Ankara-Erbil relations are going beyond
Turkey’s Kurdish question. 
 
Legitimisation of Kurdish entrepreneurs in Turkey 
The Kurdish question is an international and transnational issue with obvious direct
consequences for economic activities between Turkey and KRG that are linked to the
minority question at the national level in Turkey. The businessmen’s contribution to
the economic development of a Kurdish quasi state in the Middle East is a controversial
subject in Turkey with public opinion being quite hostile29 to the formation of a Kurdish
state  when  business  activities  started  in  2005.  The  case  of  Turkey’s  Kurdish
businessmen thus offers an interesting case to explore how a business group from a
marginalised ethnic minority can obtain a new status when its activities are compatible
with state-defined foreign policy goals, and how the economy, as a tool of soft power,
can become a tool for this particular group to express their regional political demands
for southeast Turkey. 
Economic activities between Turkey and KRG fall within a context where economics
and politics  are  superimposed.  Moreover,  they include foreign policy  and domestic
questions, such as the Kurdish minority issue in Turkey. As previously stated, my field
work indicated that the main variable for categorising the businessmen interviewed is
ethnicity. Their motivations, modes of access, relations with the political sphere, both
in Turkey and KRG, their stakes and challenges, problems and support were basically
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determined by whether they were ethnic Kurds or Turks. In this sense, the economic
commitments of a Kurdish businessman have many more political consequences than
those of a Turkish businessman. Even if both groups have been criticised by certain
state actors (e.g. the military), political parties (Turkish nationalist parties) and public
opinion, especially up to 2009,30 for assisting in KRG’s state building process, which was
perceived as a threat to Turkey’s security, Kurdish businessmen, especially those based
in  the  southeast  are  additionally  considered  as  volunteers  and  main  economic
supporters  of  the  Kurdish  state  formation  in  Iraq.  Until  2010,  when  the  army
checkpoint  at  the  Khabour  border  has  stopped  its  control  activities,  some Kurdish
business  people  suffered  economic  damage  after  they  were  refused  access  to  the
border.  However,  by opening its  consulate  in Erbil,  the Turkish state  confirmed its
commitment to bilateral relations and economic activities, which at the beginning were
not supported domestically, as tools of Ankara’s foreign policy objectives. 
Their compatibility with the state’s foreign policy objectives and soft power strategies
allowed Turkey’s Kurdish businessmen to build up a new and special relationship with
the political sphere. Soft power, which is traditionally defined, designed and controlled
by the state, has become, in the case of Kurdish businessmen, an instrument for non-
state  actors,  giving  them  the  opportunity  to  create  a  new  and  specific  space  at  a
national level. Thus their contribution, through an ethnic motivation initially, to the
state  building  process  of  a  neighbouring  state,  has  had  consequences  for  Turkey’s
domestic  minorıty question while  empowering these non-state actors  in relation to
Turkish state authority. 
As the former president of the Diyarbakır Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Mehmet
Kaya,  noted,  “businessmen’s  travels  to  Iraqi  Kurdistan  abolished  taboos,  and  trade
normalised Turkish-Kurdish relations. This normalisation will change public opinion
towards Kurds in Turkey; it will be an opportunity to solve the Kurdish question in
Turkey”.  He  also  underlined  that  the  principal  reason  for  his  commitment  was  to
contribute to the Southeast’s economic development and obtain opportunities for the
resolution of Turkey’s Kurdish question.31 Ferda Cemiloğlu, a committed Kurdish-origin
businesswoman in Turkey-KRG economic and political relations, shares the same will.
She stated that she is not doing business in KRG out of economic interest, but for the
Kurdish nation’s economic development, which has strategic importance for both Iraqi
and Turkey’s Kurds.32 
Ironically,  these  particular  motivations  of  Kurdish  businessmen  are  no  longer
perceived as “a threat” by the state because their activities are in perfect compatibility
with Turkey’s  foreign policy objectives.  For the first  time,  two major preconditions
defined by the state in its relations with businessmen, “legitimacy” and “contribution
to national interest” have been met by Kurdish businessmen. This new situation has
enlarged their sphere of action so that they are more often invited to political meetings
regarding the eventual resolution of the Kurdish question. As their activities match the
national  interest  as  defined  by  the  state  and its  soft  power  strategies,  they  obtain
legitimacy and access to the political sphere. Most Kurdish businessmen economically
active in KRG are also members or representatives of business associations, while their
activities in KRG reinforce their civil society affiliations and widen their field of action
in negotiations with the Turkish state. 
This  situation  of  Kurdish  businessmen  can  be  compared  to  that  of  Turkish  Jewish
businessmen who enlarged their negotiation capacities with the state as a minority
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through their service in the state’s foreign policy objectives, especially in the USA. As R.
Kastoryano  notes,  an  international  political  function  was  attributed  to  Jewish
businessmen  because  of  their  involvement  in  transnational  solidarity  networks
(Kastoryano 1992). Using this particular tool especially at the end of the Cold war, they
created a pressure group supporting Turkish foreign policy strategies. Alongside their
informal affiliation to Turkey’s foreign policy objectives, they simultaneously formed a
lobby to negotiate over its community interests. 
Legitimate action recognised by the state internationally has thus been transformed
into  a  national  level  benefit  for  minority  members.  As  many  interviewed  Kurdish
businessmen  reported,  these  economic  activities  contribute  to  southeast  Turkey’s
economic development. They are allowed by the state thanks to their contribution to
foreign  policy  strategies.  Thus  Kurdish  businessmen have  a  relative  opportunity  of
access to the political sphere. This situation, actually, could provide the foundations for
a Kurdish bourgeoisie.  Soft  power is  strengthened by the participation of economic
actors in creating the conditions for a non-state actor group’s political participation.
Turkey’s  economic  soft  power  has  had  three  main  consequences  for  Kurdish
businessmen, especially those based in southeast Turkey: first, taboos related to the
existence of a Kurdish state have withered away, making the Kurdish question more
freely  discussed;  second,  economic  integration has  formed the basis  of  Turkey-KRG
relations and reinforced as well as legitimised Kurdish businessmen’s status with state
authorities;  finally,  this  economic  exchange  has  enriched  investors  in  southeast
Turkey, who could constitute a source for the emergence of a Kurdish bourgeoisie. 
 
Conclusion
By  developing  trade  worth  11  billion  dollars  per  year  between  Turkey  and  Iraq  –
according to Turkish Ministry of Economy statistics for 2013 – Turkey’s businessmen
have contributed to the economic consolidation of Turkish soft power in the Middle
East. As a concept related to power in general, soft power has usually been considered
within a state-centric approach. However, soft power strategies require action by non-
state actors, such as businessmen, civil society organisations, artists or filmmakers, it is
thanks to the contribution of non-state actors that soft power circulates.
The  case  of  Turkey-KRG  relations  confirms  this  role  of  non-state  actors.  Business
activities  have  been  the  basis  of  Turkish-Kurdish  relations  and  contributed  to  the
abandonment of several taboos related to the existence of a Kurdish state in the Middle
East. As well as contributing to the Turkish state’s soft power strategies in the Middle
East, businessmen are also at the origin of a quite new phenomenon. Thanks to the
compatibility of their activities with Turkey’s recent foreign policy strategies, Turkey’s
Kurdish businessmen have obtained a new status with state actors. Their activities have
been “legitimised”, and they are now able to strengthen their negotiation capacities
concerning their political and social demands concerning Turkey’s Kurdish question.
Thus, a particular group of non-state actors have benefitted from the consequences of
the state’s  soft  power strategies in order to reintroduce the minority question into
domestic  debate.  The  state’s  soft  power  strategy  has  thus  become  a  tool  for  this
particular group in domestic politics. 
The  economic  activities  of  Turkey’s  businessmen  in  KRG  have  created  a  field  for
implementing Turkish soft power, paradoxically, despite – and sometimes against – the
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will  and control of the state. By using their capacity for transnational action, these
activities  are  challenging  the  state.  This  underlines  the  complex  relation  between
private actors and the state in foreign policy, and weakens soft power as an analytical
concept.  This concept,  which prioritises the intentions and actions of public actors,
underestimates  the  complexity  of  relations  between  public  and  private  actors,
especially the transnational capacities and actions of private actors, as well as their
ability to challenge the state and to escape from its control – as demonstrated in the
particular case examined in this article. A further question appears about behaviours of
these private actors towards the state and vice versa when domestic circumstances
change dramatically around the Kurdish question in Turkey. A future fieldwork which
will be based on interviews with the same businessmen in the South East can allow to
compare the evolution of  these business actors’  relations with the state during the
official peace process (2013-2015) and in the period of armed conflict between Turkish
security forces and PKK (since summer 2015) and to bring explanations to the following
question: What role can these local business actors play in the post conflict recovery
and reconstruction period in the South East Turkey? 
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1. “We the people of Iraq who have just risen from our stumble, and who are looking with confidence to the
future through a republican, federal, democratic, pluralistic system, have resolved with the determination
of our men, women, the elderly and youth, to respect the rules of law.” The Iraqi state building process
was legally started by this political will proclaimed in the preamble of the 2005 Iraqi constitution.
The  people  of  Iraq,  which  include  several  ethnic  and  religious  groups,  agreed  on  federal
principles. This “exogenous state building” process (see Dodge 2006), led essentially by external
actors (especially United States), has faced many difficulties from security to unemployment. The
failure of the process worsened sectarian tensions between Shias and Sunnis and reinforced civil
war conditions. Yet, in Northern Iraq, the Kurdish government, politically isolated from the rest
of Iraq since 1991, undertook a relatively successful state building process. Although this can not
be  considered  separately  from  the  central  government  in  Bagdad,  the  Kurdish  Regional
Government (KRG) is working in many domains as an autonomous political entity that can be
called “a quasi state” (see Özdemirkıran, 2013). Dispersed across four countries (Turkey, Iraq,
Iran and Syria), Kurdish people have never had an independent nation state. Thus, the political
transformation  in  Iraq  that  started  after  the  US  intervention  in  1991  gave  Iraqi  Kurds  an
opportunity to “govern themselves”. However, they experienced a period of internal fighting in
which the territory of Kurdistan in Iraq was divided between the two warring sides of KDP and
PUK. The isolated status of Northern Iraq also prevented Kurds from building a state as they lived
under a double embargo (international sanctions on the Saddam regime through the oil for food
program and economic restrictions imposed by Saddam Hussein against the Kurdish region). In
2005,  for  the first  time in their  history,  Kurdish people  gained federal  status  and control  of
economic resources when the Iraqi state was restructured with the constitution of 2005. Today,
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the  KRG  has  a  monopoly  of  violence  in  Northern  Iraq  in  Weberian  terms,  has  economic
independence from Bagdad as it can control 17% of Iraqi oil, has its own police force and army
[peshmerga], uses its own flag and collects taxes. Thus, it is effectively operating as a state (see
Pierson  1996).  KRG  is  not  completely  independent  in  its  foreign  policy  but  has  a  lot  more
privileges than many other federal states. For example, KRG controls the Turkey-Iraq and Iran-
Iraq borders so foreigners crossing either border receive a KRG stamp on their passports and has
to apply for an Iraqi visa to travel on to the rest of Iraq. KRG has also diplomatic representation
abroad and conducts negotiations in its foreign relations, for example with Turkey regarding
energy and border security, despite the opposition of central government. In short,  although
KRG is not officially an independent state, it can clearly categorised as a quasi-state.
2. Interview with Deniz Kutlu, Commercial attaché of Turkish consulate in Erbil, Erbil, January 9,
2011.
3. The data was collected for my PhD thesis. (Özdemirkıran 2013).
4. See  Richard Rosecrance’s  2010  article  in  Foreign  Affairs,  in  which he  revisits  his  idea  of  a
“trading world” to criticise these aspects, above all its imperfections and dysfunctional nature,
notably regarding “small” trading states in Southeast Asia. 
5. Ayșe  Buǧra  concludes  that  Turkish businessmen do not  behave according to  the  classical
rationality of the market economy and feel a lack of confidence regarding the “legitimacy” of
their activities, specifically for obtaining purely material benefits. See also Ayşe Buğra (1987).
6. For  a  detailed  analysis  of  the  rise  of  business  association  as  an  actor  in  Foreign  Policy
(organisations such as DEİK, TUSKON) see Altay Atlı’s (2011). 
7. MÜSİAD is the acronym for Müstakil  Sanayiciler ve İșadamları  Derneǧi,  founded in 1999. This
association is composed of entrepreneurs that define themselves as “pious” and conservative,
generally originally from cities in Anatolia. The “MÜ” in MÜSİAD means müstakil (independent),
yet lets itself also be known as müslüman (Muslim in Turkish) and refers to this newly emerging
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and Africa. Blamed by the government for its alleged ties with the Gülen movement (in conflict
with the government since 2013 – see other articles on this movement in this special issue), this
organisation does not have an active role anymore in Turkey’s economic diplomacy. 
10. For example, Prime Minister Erdoğan declared during his visit  to Iraq in 2008 that trade
capacity  between  Turkey  and  Iraq  should  reach  25  billion  dollars.  A  strategic  cooperation
agreement was signed during this  visit,  with both Iraqi  and Turkish leaders  underlining the
importance of KRG’s participation to economic integration between Turkey and Iraq.
11. Interview with İlnur Cevik, Ankara, May 26, 2008.
12. Only interviews directly linked to the topic of this special issue are mentioned in this article.
For  detailed  information  about  the  sociological  characteristics  of  the  businessmen,  see
Özdemirkıran (2013). 
13. This situation of mutual hostility has increased since KRG President Massoud Barzani was
welcomed by Prime Minister Erdoğan in 2013 in Diyarbakır, the symbolic capital city for Turkey’s
Kurds, and since the “peace process” on Kurdish question started in Turkey. 
14. The International Bagdad Expo was transferred to Gaziantep for security reasons. The fair
was organised as the Expo Gateway to Iraq from 2006 to 2010.
15. Interview with Mehmet Arslan, President of Gaziantep Chamber of Commerce, Gaziantep,
June 23, 2008.
16. This protocol for the development of economic cooperation was signed between Diyarbakır
Chamber  of  Commerce  and  Industry,  Erbil  Chamber  of  Commerce  and  Duhok  Chamber  of
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Commerce in May 2008.  For the content and Mehmet Kaya’s (former President of Diyarbakır
Chamber  of  Commerce  and  Industry)  and  Dara  Ali’s  (former  President  of  Erbil  Chamber  of
Commerce) declarations see (Haberler May 16, 2008).
17. Interview with Galip Ensarioğlu, President of Diyarbakır Chamber of Commerce and Industry,
Diyarbakır, May 13, 2009 (G. Ensarioğlu is currently a deputy of AKP).
18. Interview with Sıdıka Halıcıoğlu, President of Iraqi Turkish Businessmen and Businesswomen
Association et  Erkut Temiz,  Vice-president of  Iraqi  Turkish Businessmen and Businesswomen
Association, Istanbul, June 4, 2010.
19. Interview with Soran Aziz, Vice-president of Erbil Chamber of Commerce, Erbil, January 9,
2011.
20. Interview with Haktan Akın, Istanbul, May 31, 2010.
21. Interview with Soran Aziz, Vice-president of Erbil Chamber of Commerce, Erbil, January 9,
2011.
22. During its third term in office, beginning in 2011, the AKP government modified the structure
of ministers with the activities of the Under-Secretary for Foreign Trade being re-structured in
accordance with the Ministry of  the Economy,  which was conceived as  a  new ministry.  This
decision indicates the importance that AKP leaders accord to international  trade in Turkey’s
economy as they see foreign trade (exports) as the spine of the Turkish economy. 
23. Interview with Sıdıka Halıcıoğlu, Istanbul, June 4, 2010.
24. Interview with Soran Aziz, Erbil, January 9, 2011.
25. Ibid.
26. Interview with Deniz Kutlu, Commercial attaché of Turkish consulate in Erbil, September 1,
2011.
27. Interview with Muhammed S., Erbil, January 10, 2011.
28. Official  negotiations between Turkish state authorities (government, intelligence services,
etc.) and Abdullah Öcalan, founder of PKK, in jail on İmralı Island are at the origin of the peace
process (known also solution process).
29. According to a 2010 survey carried out by KONDA with 10,393 respondents, over
40% of Turks do not want to share their private sphere with a Kurd (as a neighbour,
partner or relative). Even if Turks and Kurds affirm their willingness for a democratic
resolution,  32.4%  of  Turks  still  think  that  only  coercive  methods  can  resolve  the
Kurdish question. See (Konda 2011).
30. Thanks to the visits of Turkish President Abdullah Gül in 2009 and Minister of Foreign affairs
Ahmet Davutoğlu in 2011, and finally thanks to the opening of the Turkish consulate in Erbil,
bilateral political relations have been normalised. 
31. Interview with Mehmet Kaya, Diyarbakır, June 2, 2010.
32. Interview with Ferda Cemiloğlu, Erbil, January 9, 2011.
ABSTRACTS
When the new Iraqi constitution was proclaimed in 2005, Kurds obtained the opportunity to build
a  de  facto state  in  the  north  of  Iraq.  As  a  neighbour  state  Turkey  has  involved  in  the
infrastructure  construction  of  Kurdish  Regional  Government  (KRG)  through  the  activities  of
businessmen  although  the  formation  of  a  Kurdish  state  in  the  Middle  East  was  a  taboo  in
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Ankara’s foreign policy. These business activities allowed to Turkey and KRG to build bilateral
political relations as well as to strengthen Turkey’s soft power in the region. At the same time, as
their  activities  were considered compatible  with the state’s  foreign policy strategies  Kurdish
businessmen of Turkey benefited from these activities to reintroduce a minority question into
the domestic political debate. This article shows how by using their capacity for transnational
action, a group of non-state actors contributes to state’s soft power and challenges at the same
time the state in order to strengthen its  influence in domestic  politics.  Through the case of
Turkey’s businessmen in KRG, this article analyzes how the concept of soft power gains a larger
definition as a means for private actors.
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